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DUE PROCESS AND THE MEXICAN DIVORCE
Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel
16 N.Y.2d 64, 209 N.E.2d 709 (1965)
In 1954 Felix Kaufman obtained a divorce from his wife, the present
Mrs. Rosenstiel, in the district court at Juarez in Chihuahua, Mexico.
Kaufman went to Juarez where he signed the Municipal Register in order to
meet residence requirements. He then filed with the district court a certificate
showing such registration and a petition for divorce based on incompatibility
and ill treatment between the spouses. The next day his wife, through an
attorney duly authorized to act for her, made an appearance in the Mexican
court and filed an answer in which she submitted to the jurisdiction of the
court and admitted the allegations in her husband's complaint. A degree of
divorce was then issued. Two years later, in 1956, the Rosenstiels were
married. In 1962 Louis Rosenstiel brought this action to annul their marriage,
alleging that the 1954 divorce was void and that, accordingly, Mrs. Rosen-
stiel remained married to Kaufman.
The trial court granted Mr. Rosenstiel the annulment, refusing to recog-
nize the Mexican divorce decree on the theory that the Mexican court was
without jurisdiction to issue the decree. Neither party to the action had
been domiciled in the State of Chihuahua and domicile of at least one of the
parties was held to be requisite for jurisdiction to grant the divorce.
The supreme court reversed this decision and the Court of Appeals of
New York, when presented with this issue for the first time, held that although
no domicile of either party was shown to be within the jurisdiction, New
York will give recognition to foreign divorce decrees where personal juris-
diction of one party to the marriage has been acquired by physical appear-
ance before the court and jurisdiction of the other has been acquired by the
appearance and pleading of an authorized attorney.
This court, in holding that "domicile is not intrinsically an indispensable
prerequisite to jurisdiction"'- in a divorce case, approved a series of decisions
extending over a period of twenty-seven years in the New York Supreme
Court at Appellate Division and at Special Term which recognized the
validity of bilateral Mexican divorces. 2 This lower court history was sum-
marized in the case of Skolnick v. Skolnick, as follows: "A plethora of
decisions lends consistency and uniformity to the ruling by the courts that
Mexican decrees of divorce will be upheld where there has been a personal
1 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, 16 N.Y.2d 64, 73, 209 N.E.2d 709, 712 (1965).
2 Weibel v. Weibel, 37 Misc. 2d 162, 234 N.Y.S.2d 298 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Bowen v.
Bowen, 22 Misc. 2d 496, 195 N.Y.S.2d 307 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Costi v. Costi, 133 N.Y.S.2d
447 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 194 Misc. 73, 85 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1949);
Leviton v. Leviton, 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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appearance by one of the parties in Mexico and an appearance by a duly
authorized attorney in behalf of the other. ' 3
Over this period of approximately a quarter of a century the New York
courts have been presented with three distinguishable types of Mexican
divorce decrees; "mail-order" decrees, "ex parte" decrees, and "bilateral"
decrees. The first type of divorce decree may be obtained by the parties
executing powers-of-attorney in favor of Mexican attorneys. Consequently,
it is accomplished without appearance by either party in Mexico; Mexican
counsel represent the parties before the Mexican court and the divorce is
then forwarded to them by mail. These divorces have been held absolutely
void in the United States. 4 The "ex parte" or "one party" divorce is issued
when plaintiff personally appears in the Mexican court and there has been
at least constructive service of process on the defendant. The defendant does
not appear in the action, either personally or by duly authorized attorney,
thus giving rise to the name "one party" divorce. This decree also is held
void in New York.6 To obtain a decree of the third type, a "bilateral" decree,
the plaintiff must appear personally before the Mexican court, and the
defendant must appear either in person or by duly authorized counsel.
This is the type of decree that was presented for recognition in the principal
case. Each type of decree involves the same jurisdictional question, i.e.,
whether the domicile of either party to the action in the divorce granting
jurisdiction is absent.6
The facts of the Rosenstel case support the conclusion of the court of
appeals, that "the physical contact with the Mexican jurisdiction was
ephemeral." T Neither of the Kaufmans had domicile in Mexico in the tra-
ditional sense of the word.8 The court was faced with the problem of deter-
mining the necessity of domicile as a prerequisite to recognition of a foreign
divorce; important to the resolution of this issue was the fact that the
decree presented for recognition originated in the court of a foreign country
rather than in the court of a sister state. In holding that domicile was not
3 Skolnick v. Skolnick, 24 Misc. 2d 1077, 1078, 204 N.Y.S.2d 63, 64 (Sup. Ct.
1960).
4 Garman v. Garman, 102 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1939); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.
App. 2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60
(1948) ; Smith v. Smith, 72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943).
5 Maltese v. Maltese, 32 Misc. 2d 993, 224 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
6 As will be indicated later in this note, it is only the bilateral decree which affords
the -afeguards of due process in that the proceeding is one in which the defendant ap-
pears, either personally or by duly authorized counsel, and actually litigates the issues. The
defendant, rather than having his interests determined in a distant tribunal in a
proceeding in which he does not appear, has a real opportunity to participate in the
determination of his interests.
7 Rosenstiel v. Rosenstiel, supra note 1, at 72, 209 N.E.2d at 711.
8 Domicile has been defined as the place where a person has voluntarily fixed his
abode, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of
making it his home, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.
Black, Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951).
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required, the New York court departed from the decisions of other states
that have adjudicated this issue. Whether one state must give recognition to
a divorce decree issued in another state is determined by the full faith and
credit clause of the Constitution, while recognition of a foreign divorce
decree is governed by considerations of comity. An analysis of the problem of
sister state divorce decrees and the full faith and credit clause is useful
because today, there is a definite trend toward uniformity in the vari-
ous areas of the law and the Supreme Court of the United States has
worked out definite principles with respect to divorce jurisdiction. As indi-
cated before, these principles are not necessarily the ones that govern the
recognition of a foreign divorce. Uniformity of divorce law, however, calls for
similar requirements in both cases. Since the obligations of the full faith
and credit clause are mandatory upon the states, and this, in turn, has signifi-
cance for any uniformity in divorce law, an understanding of the full faith
and credit problem is necessary.
Today, by constitutional mandate9 and federal statute,10 the judicial
proceedings of every state are entitled in all other states to the same full
faith and credit which they enjoy in the state from which they were taken-
except when it is proved the foreign court had no jurisdiction of the person
or of the subject matter." Whether the divorce decree of one state is to be
given full faith and credit in a sister state, therefore, will depend upon a
finding of requisite jurisdictional facts.
The Supreme Court of the United States, when deciding the issue of
jurisdiction in early divorce cases, spoke in terms of domicile because it was
always a statutory jurisdictional requirement of the state which granted
the divorce. Typical of these early cases was Bell v. Bell,12 which involved
a divorce rendered in a state where neither party was domiciled. The de-
fendant had only constructive service of process. The Court held that "no
valid divorce.., can be decreed [where jurisdiction is based] on constructive
service by the courts of a State in which neither party is domiciled."' 3 This
case apparently was the basis for dicta in later cases to the effect that
domicile is a prerequisite for jurisdiction to grant a divorce, 14 and that di-
9 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
1o 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1964) provides: "Such ... judicial proceedings ... shall have
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as they have by
law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken."
31 Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. 457 (1873).
12 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
13 Id. at 177.
14 Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945),
purported to state the rule that domicile is the basis for jurisdiction of the subject
matter in a matrimonial action: "Under our system of law, judicial power to grant a
divorce-jurisdiction strictly speaking-is founded on domicile. .. . The framers of the
Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite, and since 1789 neither
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vorce is to be regarded not as an action in personam, but rather as resembling
an action in rem, with the marital status constituting the res.1 5 However, the
Supreme Court, in three recent cases, 6 arguably has circumvented these early
notions which have questionable constitutional basis.
The first of these cases, Sherrer v. Sherrer,17 involved domiciliaries of
Massachusetts. Mrs. Sherrer instituted divorce proceedings in Florida in which
her husband personally appeared denying all the allegations in her com-
plaint-including that of Florida residence. A settlement was agreed upon
and, at this hearing, the issue of domicile was not raised. The settlement was
later challenged by the husband in a Massachusetts proceeding on the ground
that the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to render the settlement. On appeal
the Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional issue in the Florida action
was res judicata since the parties had full opportunity to litigate it although
they did not. The facts in Sherrer's companion case, Coe v. Coe,1s are similar
except that defendant's answer admitted plaintiff's allegation of domicile. In
a subsequent Massachusetts proceeding the Nevada decree was held void for
want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed holding that the decree was
res judicata since the defendant had full opportunity to litigate the jurisdic-
tional issue.19
The full significance of these two cases was revealed in the case of
Johnson v. Muelberger,20 decided three years later. This case extended the
Sherrer-Coe doctrine to third parties. Where by the law of the divorcing state
a divorce could not be attacked on jurisdictional grounds by the parties who
are actually before the court, the full faith and credit clause precludes attack
this Court nor any other court in the English-speaking world has questioned it." How-
ever this issue was not before the Court and therefore the statement was not necessary
to the holding in the case.
15 The argument supporting this view was used in the case of Alton v. Alton, 207
F.2d 667, 673 (3d Cir. 1953), vacated as moot, 347 U.S. 610 (1954), where the court said:
"The background of divorce legislation and litigation shows that it has not been con-
sidered a simple transitory personal action. The principle said to govern is that the
marriage is a matter of public concern, as well as a matter of interest to the parties
involved. Because it is a matter of public concern, the public, through the state, has an
interest both in its formation and in its dissolution, and the state which has the interest
is the state of domicile, because it is where the party 'dwelleth and hath his home."' As
indicated, this case was vacated as moot and the Supreme Court never passed on the
holding of the lower court.
16 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 US. 581 (1951); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948);
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
17 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
18 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
19 See also Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938). Mrs. Davis, in an action in the
District of Columbia, challenged the validity of a prior Virginia divorce decree. Mrs. Davis
had appeared in the Virginia action and contested the jurisdictional issue which was
decided against her. The lower court found that the Virginia court had no jurisdiction
but was reversed by the Supreme Court which held the determination of this issue by
the Virginia court was res judicata.
20 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
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in every other state. Here a daughter attempted, in a New York proceeding,
to attack on jurisdictional grounds her deceased father's Florida divorce.
It -was held that since she could not collaterally attack the divorce in Florida
the decree was entitled to full faith and credit.
A careful reading reveals that more is involved in these cases than the
mere holding that the parties are estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue
in a subsequent proceeding in which a judgment is collaterally attacked.
Underlying each decision is a determination that the requirements of due
process have been met, and consequently, full faith and credit must be
accorded the decree. If the defendant is personally served within the state,
or enters an appearance, every safeguard inherent in due process is complied
with. In other words, where both parties are before the court, neither is denied
due process. The Supreme Court, in determining under these circumstances
whether due process has been accorded to each of the parties, appears to be
solely concerned with safeguarding the interests of the parties which would
be decided by a litigation. If each party has had an opportunity to fully liti-
gate the issues the decree will be entitled to full faith and credit irrespective
of a finding of no domicile.
The Supreme Court has never held that domicile is necessary where
both parties are before the court. This is partly due to the fact that almost
every state requires domicile before it will grant a divorce. 21 This issue would
have been decided in the case of Alton v. Alton,22 however the case was
vacated as moot for other reasons.2 3 Parenthetically, there is no mention of
domicile in the Constitution, let alone an express provision that domicile
is the rule for jurisdiction to grant a divorce. If the issue is ever squarely
presented to the Court, it is unlikely that it will be able to find constitutional
21 This simply means that as almost every state requires, by statute, that before its
courts may grant a divorce the plaintiff must be domiciled in that state; the Supreme
Court in review determines if this statutory requirement has been met, and does not have
to decide the necessity of domicile independent of state requirement, i.e., since domicile
is required by statute, the Court does not have to decide the issue of whether it would
be necessary for jurisdiction if there were no statute so providing.
22 Supra note 15. In 1953 the Legislative Assembly of the Virgin Islands passed an
act amending § 9 of the Divorce Law of 1944 by adding to it an additional subsection
(a) which reads: "Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 8 and 9 hereof, if the
plaintiff is within the district at the time of the filing of the complaint and has been
continuously for six weeks immediately prior thereto, this shall be prima fade evidence
of domicil, and where the defendant has been personally served within the district or
enters a general appearance in the action, then the Court shall have jurisdiction of the
action and of the parties thereto without further reference to domicile or to the place
where the marriage was solemnized or the cause of action arose.' Id. at 669. (Emphasis
added.) In considering this statute the Court would have passed on the issue of whether
domicile is an indispensable prerequisite for jurisdiction to grant a divorce.
23 While review of this decision was pending before the Supreme Court the husband
obtained a final divorce in a Connecticut state court. The wife personally appeared in
the action and did not contest the decision. The judgment of the district court of the
Virgin Islands was accordingly vacated and the cause dismissed as moot.
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support for such a doctrine. Rather, in light of these recent Supreme Court
decisions, it seems likely that in personam divorces granted by non-domiciliary
states will be upheld. In other words, a determination will be made that full
faith and credit must be accorded divorces granted in the absence of domicile
where the court has obtained jurisdiction over the defendant, either by his
personal appearance or appearance by duly authorized counsel.
Divorces issued by foreign countries stand on different ground from
that of sister state divorce decrees. The obligations imposed by the full faith
and credit clause do not extend to decrees issued by foreign countries,
and when recognition is given to such decrees, it is based on the principles of
comity rather than full faith and credit. As a general rule foreign judgments
and decrees of divorce are recognized; however, if the procedure or sub-
stantive divorce law of the foreign nation is repugnant to the public policy
of the state then recognition is denied. Thus a foreign divorce will not be
recognized where it was obtained under circumstances which offend the public
policy of the state wherein recognition is sought. These public policy con-
siderations take the form of inquiries into the following: whether the
foreign court had jurisdiction of the subject matter; the presence of any col-
lusion between the parties, i.e., consensual arrangement; the grounds for
divorce existing in the state where recognition is sought and what the ground
for divorce was in the particular case; and finally, if the jurisdictional
requirements of the state asked to give recognition have been met. Thus the
court in Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, stated that "under comity-as contrasted
with full faith and credit--our courts have power to deny even prima facie
validity to the judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons, despite what-
ever allegations of jurisdiction may appear on the face of such foreign
judgments."2 4
Of the four jurisdictions which have been confronted with the issue in
the Rosenstiel case-New York, New Jersey, New Mexico, and Ohio-three
have declared this type of divorce to be absolutely void. New York is presently
the only state to give recognition to the Mexican "bilateral" divorce decree.
In the Ohio case of Bobala v. Bobala,25 the husband instituted divorce
proceedings in Chihuahua and obtained a divorce. The wife appeared through
duly authorized counsel to contest the divorce and when her appeal was
denied after having lost on the merits, she brought suit for divorce in Ohio.
As the Mexican court had only dissolved the marriage contract, the purpose
of her divorce suit in Ohio was to obtain an award of support and maintenance
for herself and her child. The Ohio Supreme Court said, "Jurisdiction is
prescribed by law and cannot be increased or diminished by the consent of
the parties, and where there is want of jurisdiction of the subject matter a
judgment is void.... It cannot be doubted that if the Mexican court, because
of the nonresidence of the appellant, had no jurisdiction, the decree could in
no case affect the marriage status of these parties in Ohio."'2 6 Here, because
24 Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 309 N.Y. 371, 375 130 N.E.2d 902, 903 (1955).
25 68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N.E.2d 845 (1940).
26 Id. at 71, 33 N.E.2d at 849. When Ohio speaks of residence, the concept is
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there was no residence by either party in Chihuahua, the Ohio Supreme Court
determined that the Mexican court was without jurisdiction to grant the
divorce. The wife's Ohio divorce decree was accordingly upheld.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in the case of Golden v. Golden
2 T
when presented with a situation similar to that in Bobala, arrived at a similar
finding. There the husband and wife drove from their home in Tucumcari,
New Mexico to Juarez, Mexico. A Mexican attorney handled the entire affair,
neither party at any time being required to appear for the purpose of sworn
testimony. Within a few hours after their arrival they had their divorce papers
and were on their way back to Tucumcari. The highest court of New Mexico
refused to recognize the divorce because of the absence of domicile in
Mexico on the part of either party. The court held that "neither of the parties
had established a 'residence' in Juarez, under any known definition of
residence. They went to Juarez, Mex., for one sole purpose, to secure a
decree of divorce and then depart. 2 8
Prior to New York, the most recent examination of this issue was by
New Jersey in the case of Warrender v. Warrender,29 decided in 1963.
Husband and wife were domiciliaries of New Jersey. Plaintiff-wife flew down
to Chihuahua and instituted divorce proceedings in which her husband ap-
peared through counsel. She obtained a divorce on the day she arrived and flew
back the next. The New Jersey court treated the decree as absolutely void
since there was, in fact, no residence or domicile shown.30
New York, as indicated by Rosenstiel, has taken a more liberal attitude
with regard to jurisdictional requirements. Since the case of Leviton v.
Leviton,31 in 1938, if a Mexican divorce decree has been issued under
circumstances where the court had personal jurisdiction of the parties, the
decree is given recognition by New York courts. This judicial policy with
synonymous with that of domicile. "The word 'resident' . . . means one who possesses a
domiciliary residence, a residence accompanied by an intention to make the State of
Ohio a permanent home. A temporary residence, no matter how long it may be extended,
does not meet the requirements of such statute." Saalfeld v. Saalfeld, 86 Ohio App. 225,
89 N.E.2d 165, 166 (1949).
It must be noted that in the Bobala case the wife personally appeared in the Mexican
divorce proceedings to contest the action. The court however adhered to its domicile
requirement and refused to recognize the foreign decree-despite the fact that plaintiff
had contested the action in Mexico.
27 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937).
28 Id. at 364, 68 P.2d at 933. By the term "residence," New Mexico contemplates a
residence of a permanent and fixed character, as actual residence substantially like that
attributable to the term domicile. The phrase "actual resident in good faith" as used in
the divorce statute does not mean one who resides in the state for the time being, but one
who has a residence of "a permanent and fixed character, a domicile." Allen v. Allen, 52
N.M. 174, 178, 194 P.2d 271, 273 (1948).
29 79 N.J. Super. 114, 190 A.2d 684 (App. Div. 1963), aff'd, 42 N.J. 287, 200 A.2d
123 (1964).
30 Id. at 123, 190 A.2d at 689.
31 6 N.Y.S.2d 535 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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respect to Mexican divorces appears to be inconsistent with the state's
restrictive domestic divorce policy. New York recognizes only one ground for
divorce, i.e., adultery, and even this must be proved by third-party testi-
mony.32
This apparent inconsistency, however, may be explained in several ways.
First, this decision is consistent with the recent Supreme Court decisions
respecting sister state divorce cases.3 3 As indicated earlier, the concern seems
to be safeguarding the interests of the parties involved in litigation, in re-
quiring that due process be accorded each party. If each party is given a full
opportunity to contest the issues in a case, then each party's interest has
been protected and the requirements of due process have been met. This
judgment will then be accorded full faith and credit-irrespective of domicile.
These same safeguards are present in the Mexican "bilateral" decree. Before
New York will recognize a Mexican divorce, the defendant must appear in
the action, either personally or by duly authorized counsel; thus, he is given
a full opportunity to litigate the issues and is guaranteed due process. In
this respect, New York is consistent with current judicial policy, whereas
Ohio, New Jersey, and New Mexico are out of step. These states must give
recognition to sister state decrees under similar circumstances and it would
only be consistent to follow this policy in cases of foreign divorce, as New
York has. It is true that a state does not have to recognize a foreign judgment
under these circumstances, yet not to do so, when so required if presented
with a similar decree from a sister state, only complicates the law of divorce.
A second explanation for the decision in this case may relate to a recent
highly publicized study being conducted by the New York Legislature. The
Joint Legislative Committee on Matrimonial and Family Laws is currently
considering proposals for a modern matrimonial statute to be introduced in
the 1966 session of the legislature,34 and it is possible that one of the more
liberal divorce statutes in the country may be the product of this study. It is
probable that this was considered by the court and, in some part, affected the
Rosenstiel decision.
If the underlying consideration in divorce litigation is safeguarding the
interests of the parties involved through the requirements of due process, then
the decision in the principle case and the New York courts are in step with
current judicial policy. The courts of Ohio, New Jersey, and New Mexico, in
applying the questionable test of domicile, have yet to recognize the due
process justification for upholding a foreign divorce decree.
32 N.Y. Doam. Rel. Law § 170.
33 See cases cited at supra note 16.
34 These proposals purportedly relate to (a) aid in the reconciliation of married
couples seeking divorces, (b) additional substantive grounds for divorce, and (c) minors.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1965, p. 45, col. 1.
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